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A PRESCRIPTION TO EXPEDITE 
HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUPS: 
DE MINIMIS SETTLEMENTS 
AND ADR 
I. OVERVIEW 
Thousands of hazardous waste sites exist throughout the 
country leeching toxics into the soil, groundwater, and the air.l 
The consequences have meant tragic health problems, such as 
unusually high rates of cancer and birth defects in areas near 
toxic dump sites, as well as complete devastation of 
communities.2 
The government responded with an environmental cleanup 
bill called the Superfund3 - a kind of environmental "Super-
man" designed to clean up all designated toxic sites. Yet the En-
vironmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) "Superman" doesn't 
actually clean, rather, it demands that those who contribute to a 
site's contamination, pay for its cleanup.· It carries a sword to 
enforce its policy - a sword which inflicts strict liability on ev-
1. As many as ten thousand toxic waste sites exist across the country which "may 
now cost more than $100 billion to clean up - the equivalent of $400 for every U.S. 
resident .... Our poisoned atmosphere is expected to cause up to one million addi-
tional cases of skin cancer over each seventy-year lifetime in the United States alone" 
and thirty out of fifty states now have contaminated groundwater. J. HOLLENDER, How 
TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE (1990) at 99. 
2. See infra notes 18-19. 
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 
(West 1983 & Supp. 1990))[hereinafter CERCLA). 
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eryone it touches. II Not surprisingly, everyone runs from this 
sword, for it could mean inequitable results. For example, the 
small business that delivers a barrel of waste to a site could get 
struck with a disproportionate percentage of liability if the ma-
jor toxic waste contributor is not found.s Sometimes hundreds of 
these small or de minimis contributors account for less than one 
percent of the total hazardous waste at a site.7 With everyone 
runmng from the sword, few negotiated settlements are 
attained.s 
The EPA has attempted to make prOVISIOns for the de 
minimis parties to mitigate the harshness of Superfund's strict 
liability and cash them out of settlement negotiations.9 However, 
the use of this tool has been nominal. 10 
5. CERCLA, supra note 3, § 107 at 2781 (codified at V.S.C.A. § 9607(a)). This sec-
tion establishes the scope of liability under Superfund. 
6. A small manufacturer in Norwood, Massachusetts may go bankrupt because land 
they acquired was found to be contaminated with PCBs, allegedly caused by an engi-
neering company 20 to 30 years earlier. Superfund imposes strict liability on "innocent" 
landowners who did not contribute to the hazardous waste on their property, but who 
should have known about the contamination at the time of purchase. Telephone inter-
view with Cameron Kerry, attorney for the manufacturing company (Jul. 11, 1990). 
7. For an example, see infra note 66. 
8. The following is a chart of Superfund settlements to date. Jumps in the number 
of settlements seem to correspond with the EPA settlement incentives issued in guidance 
documents. In 1983, the EPA issued an interim settlement policy, and at the end of 
1986, Congress adopted amendments to Superfund including more settlement incentives. 
The weak start seems to reveal EPA's unwillingness to engage in settlement negotiations. 
Fiscal Year # of settlements amount of settlement (in millions) 
80 5 2.1 
81 10 60.3 
82 21 22.8 
83 34 108.2 
84 98 185.4 
85 135 152.1 
86 132 159.1 
87 123 199.7 
88 221 494.3 
Telephone interview with a member of the Environmental Protection Agency's enforce-
ment division (Feb. 4, 1991). 
9. In return for a cash premium paid to the EPA, de minimis parties can be relieved 
of almost all liability, provided they meet certain criteria. See generally infra notes 50-
59 and accompanying text. 
10. Testimony at a congressional hearing in June 1988 revealed "that de minimis 
settlements have received a 'relatively low priority,' that Headquarters management allo-
cated only 'one-half staff year per region.' " At that time only 5 de minimis settlements 
had been negotiated. The EPA had only budgeted for 13 in fiscal year 1989. Letter from 
John D. Dingell to The Honorable Lee M. Thomas (Sept. 7, 1988), and response letter 
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Over the last decade, as lawmakers pondered why 
Superfund was resulting in few settlements, and hence, few 
cleanups,l1 alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques to 
expedite settlement negotiations began gaining in popularity.I2 
However, despite new amendments to Superfund in 1986 to cre-
ate settlement incentives (which included arbitration for small 
cost recovery claims),13 and the increasing awareness and ap-
proval by the federal government for alternative dispute resolu-
tion,14 negotiated settlements using ADR techniques are still not 
commonplace. III 
As de minimis contributors can be some of the hardest hit 
by Superfund's liability-inflicting sword of enforcement, this 
comment discusses de minimis settlements in conjunction with 
ADR techniques as a solution to expedite the settlement process 
and hasten hazardous waste cleanups. In sum, the EPA seems 
willing to utilize ADR, but is unwilling to loosen its grip on the 
sword. In order for new settlement techniques to work, the EPA 
must hand the sword over to alternative dispute resolution. 
The first section discusses the history of Superfund and its 
1986 amendments, with a focus on de minimis contributors and 
why the de minimis settlement incentive has failed. The second 
section focuses on alternative dispute resolution and analyzes 
the government's attempts at incorporating arbitration into 
Superfund. Lastly, the comment suggests incorporating arbitra-
tion provisions into the de minimis section of Superfund. 
from Edward E. Reich to Deputy Regional Administrators (Jul. 19, 1988), reprinted in 
Progress of the Superfund Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigation of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 207, 
244 (1988). 
11. This is largely due to the time and expense it takes to litigate a case as opposed 
to negotiating a settlement. 
12. The EPA began to nominate cases for ADR in 1987. As of September, 1990, 21 
cases had been nominated, 20 for mediation techniques, and one for a mini-trial. How-
ever, out of the 20 nominated, only 12 Superfund cases actually utilized a form of alter-
native dispute resolution. Telephone interview with David C. Batson, Esq., Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Liaison, Superfund Division of the Office of Enforcement and Com-
pliance, Environmental Protection Agency (Feb. 4, 1991). 
13. See infra note 126. 
14. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text. 
15. See supra note 12. 
3
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORY OF SUPERFUND AND THE BIRTH OF THE De Minimis 
SETTLEMENT 
The Superfund bill, officially entitled the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 
1980 (CERCLA)18 emerged from heightened public and congres-
sional knowledge of the tragic consequences caused by hazard-
ous chemicals that were improperly disposed.17 Incidents such as 
Love Canape and Times Beachl9 prompted Congress to quickly 
assemble and pass20 a bill establishing a national inventory of 
hazardous waste sites,21 and response mechanisms22 which would 
enable the government to expedite cleanups of those sites that 
posed an immediate threat to public health or the 
environment.28 
CERCLA created two methods for compelling the clean up 
of hazardous waste sites. First, under section 104,24 the EPA 
16. CERCLA, supra note 3. 
17. H.R. REP. No. 1016(1), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980) reprinted in 1980 U.S. 
CODE CONGo ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120 [hereinafter Legislative History P.L. 96-510). 
18. The incident at Love Canal involved 352 million pounds of dioxin-contaminated 
chemical waste in three Hooker chemical disposal sites near Niagra Falls, NY. Serious 
threats to public health caused the evacuation of 230 families from the region and the 
devaluation of property values. "Love Canal health data shows elevated miscarriage and 
birth defect rates." Legislative History P.L. 96-510, supra note 17, at 6121-6122. 
19. A massive dioxin contamination in Missouri which inflicted thousands of people. 
20. Grad, A Legislatiue History of CERCLA, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982). Grad 
states that CERCLA "was hurriedly put together by a bipartisan group of senators. . . 
in the closing days of the lame duck session" of the 96th Congress. It was considered and 
pas'sed, after very limited debate, in a situation that allowed for no amendments. The 
House was forced to take it, or leave it, and chose to take it "groaning all the way." 
21. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605(8)(B) (West 1983). At the time of CERCLA consideration 
(1979), "the EPA estimated that as many as 30,000 to 50,000 sites existed, of which 
between 1,200-2,000 present[ed) a serious risk to public health." Legislative History P.L. 
96-510, supra note 17, at 6120. Of these, 400 were selected "superfund sites" to warrant 
immediate attention by the federal government. By 1985, the EPA had identified over 
800 "superfund sites." F. Habicht, Encouraging Settlements Under Superfund, 1 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV'T. 3 (1985). 
22. The President could either clean first, and sue for cost recovery, or force the 
responsible party to clean up via a civil suit or administrative order. See infra notes 24-
26. 
23. Legislative History P.L. 96-510, supra note 17, at 6119. 400 sites were initially 
- chosen for priority cleanup, and CERCLA authorized $600 million for a "4-year Hazard-
ous Waste Response Fund to be drawn from industry-based fees and Federal appropria-
tions .... " Legislative History P.L. 96-510, supra note 17, at 6120. 
24. CERCLA, supra note 3, § 104 at 2774, (42 U.S.C.A. § 9606 (West 1983)). This 
section entitles the President to respond by removal or remedial action whenever there is 
4
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may use the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund2C1 to re-
spond to threatened releases of hazardous waste and recover 
costs by instituting a civil action against the responsible parties 
under section 107.26 Second, under section 106,27 the EPA can 
compel private parties to clean up the site either through an ad-
ministrative order or through a civil suit. Yet, realizing the ex-
pense of cleaning up the sites and the incredible transaction 
costs28 incurred in litigation, the goal of Superfund became en-
couraging the use of negotiated settlements to promote private 
party cleanups.29 
One method CERCLA employed to encourage settlements 
was imposing far-reaching joint and several strict liability30 on 
the persons responsible for the improper disposal, the current 
owners or operators of the site, and the transporters of wastes to 
the site.31 Ostensibly, this would convince responsible parties to 
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment. 
25. Id. § 201 at 2796 (42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(k)(4)(A), (c) (West 1983)). The infamous 
"fund" of Superfund is created by taxes on certain toxic products to be paid generally by 
the persons using or exporting those toxics. 
26. Id § 107 at 2781 (42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West 1983)). This section establishes 
the scope of liability under Superfund. 
27. Id. § 106 at 2780 (42 U.S.C.A. § 9606 (West 1983)). Abatement Actions. 
28. See infra note 36. 
29. F. Habicht, Encouraging Settlements Under Superfund, NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV'T. 3 (1~85). Habicht, Assistant Attorney General of the Land and Natural Resources 
Division of the Department of Justice, explained that the primary goal of Superfund 
should be private party cleanups through negotiated settlements as they were prompt 
and cost-effective. He did note however that the Department of Justice's basic practice is 
to litigate while negotiating, saying that litigation strengthens the government's negotiat-
ing posture and fulfills their statutory responsibility under CERCLA. Unwilling to di-
minish the advantages of litigation, he notes that CERCLA's policy should be a balance 
between litigation and negotiation, with negotiation as the preferred strategy as negotia-
tion is far more amenable to issues that are complex and technical. 
30. Strict joint and several liability imposes liability on potentially responsible par-
ties, regardless of fault, for the entire cleanup of the site. Each is responsible for the 
entire cost of the. cleanup even where the party's contribution to the hazardous waste site 
was minimal. However, several Superfund cases have held that where the harm is divisi-
ble, the liability will be allocated appropriately. See T. Garrett, Superfund: Apportion-
ment of Liability, 1 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 25 (1985). 
31. CERCLA, supra note 3, § 107(a) at 2781 (42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West 1983)). 
This describes the scope and harshness of Superfund's liability provision. Named parties 
are liable for all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State, any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person, 
and damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the rea-
sonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release. 
The only defenses established are acts of God, acts of war, or acts or omissions of a third 
party other than an employee or agent in connection with a contractual agreement. Id. § 
5
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settle rather than face a lawsuit by the Department of Justice.32 
However, after 195 negotiated settlements in five years from a 
national priority list that had grown to 500 sites, the EPA real-
ized that to achieve more settlements, it needed to provide posi-
tive incentives for parties to come forward and pay their full 
share.33 Consequently, in 1985, the EPA published its first CER-
CLA settlement policy containing additional settlement incen-
tives and procedures for EPA officials to utilize in negotiating 
settlement proposals.34 
One of these settlement incentives mitigated the liability 
provisions for de minimis parties by cashing them out of the set-
tlement process. 311 Previously, a potentially responsible party, 
who contributed only minimal hazardous waste, incurred trans-
action costs defending a lawsuit that were disproportionate to 
their relative responsibility at the site.36 The situation hurt not 
107(b)(I-3). 
32. See Habicht, supra note 29, at 5. Habicht describes the litigation process with 
the EPA as vigorous and well-planned, thus inducing parties to settle. 
33. Balcke, Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986 Amendments, 
74 VA. L. REV. 123 (1989). Potentially responsible parties claimed that the EPA "relied 
too heavily on the coercive threat of joint and several strict liability, and did not offer 
positive incentives for coming to voluntary agreements." [d. at 132. See also Hazardous 
Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5035 (1985) [hereinafter 50 Fed. Reg. 
5034) (" ... voluntary cleanups are essential to a successful program for cleanup of the 
nation's hazardous waste sites."); Stoll, infra note 36, at 45. (Authors note that the EPA 
shoulq practice some of its more "positive tenets" to promote more settlements and ex-
pedite the national cleanup program). 
34. 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, supra note 33, at 5034. Briefly, this policy contains general 
principles for the EPA's review of private-party cleanup proposals; management guide-
lines for negotiation; factors governing release of information to potentially responsible 
parties; criteria for evaluating settlement offers; partial cleanup proposals; targets for 
litigation; timing for negotiations; and management and review of settlement 
negotiations. 
35. The EPA instituted other settlement tools as well. 1) The EPA changed its pol-
icy of only settling with those private parties willing to contribute 80 percent of a site's 
cleanup costs, enabling the regions to negotiate settlements whenever a private party 
made a substantial offer. 2) The EPA allowed fund dollars for orphan shares (that 
amount attributable to insolvent or unknown PRPs). 3) In order to facilitate settlements, 
the EPA agreed to release site information to the PRPs. See id. at 7. 
36. Stoll, Graham, Need for Changes in EPA's Settlement Policy, 1 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T. 7 (1985). Transaction costs include "the time and money expended by 
inside counsel, technical employees, businessmen, outside counsel and consultants in 
technical studies, negotiations or litigation." [d. at 9. Transaction costs drastically inflate 
the overall cost of cleanup. In one case, half of the $1.5 million settlement "represents 
salary costs for DOJ attorneys and paralegals," totaling $600,000. See Krickenberger, 
Rekar, Superfund Negotiators Suggest ADR As Way to Break Settlement Logjam, 3 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REP. 242, 244 (1989). 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss2/5
1991] SUPERFUND SETTLEMENTS 367 
only de mm£mis parties, but the major potentially responsible 
parties (PRPs) and EPA as well. For instance, at many sites, 
hundreds of parties are found potentially responsible, yet only 
10 to 20 parties may represent those most responsible for the 
hazardous condition of the site.37 This situation would signifi-
cantly impede settlement negotiations, as hundreds of de 
minimis parties would clutter up negotiations with the major 
contributors.38 
The EPA acknowledged in the settlement policy that the 
regional offices could enter into negotiations with PRPs "even 
though the offers do not represent a substantial portion of the 
cleanup costs. 1139 However, the EPA did not encourage de 
minimis settlements nor promote them in their settlement pol-
icy.40 With no procedure established for the regional offices to 
remove de minimis parties from the settlements, either by nego-
tiations or cash outs, no such settlements were achieved.41 
When Superfund came up for reauthorization in 1986, Con-
gress realized that CERCLA was not meeting its intended goa1.42 
Despite its 1985 settlement policy created to expedite cleanups, 
the Superfund program in its first five years spent $1.6 billion 
and started or completed clean up at only 45 of the 400 sites on 
37. Stoll, supra note 36, at 9. 
38. N. Bernstein, To Clean Up Landfills, the Leader Should be Municipalities Us-
ing Economic Incentives to Settle, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10012 (1989). ' 
39. 50 Fed Reg 5034, supra note 33, at 5042. Originally, the EPA would only negoti-
ate with those parties willing to pay one hundred percent of the cleanup costs. In 1983, 
the EPA decided to entertain settlements that accounted for 80 percent of the site's 
cleanup costs. The new settlement policy in 1985 did away with these arbitrary thresh-
olds. See Stoll, supra note 36, at 7. . 
40. "Substantial resources should not be invested in negotiations with de minimis 
contributors in light of the limited costs that may be recovered, the time needed to pre-
pare the necessary legal documents, the need for headquarters review, potential res judi-
cata effects, and other effects that de minimis settlements may have on the nature of the 
case remaining to the Government." 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, supra note 33, at 5036. 
41. The first de minimis settlement was the Ottati & Goss site in 1987. See also 
Progress of the Superfund Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
181 (1988)(statement of Richard L. Hembra, Associate Director Resources, Community, 
and Economic Development Division, General Accounting Office) "[A)ccording to an 
EPA official, no agreements of this [de minimis) nature were entered into under [EPA's 
settlement) policy." 
42. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 54 (1985), reprinted in 1986 
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its priority list.48 In addition, Congress discovered that as many 
as 10,000 Superfund sites existed across the nation, with an esti-
mated aggregate cleanup cost of $100 billion.44 In contrast, when 
Congress drafted CERCLA in 1980, it had estimated that only 
1,200-2,000 hazardous waste sites existed that warranted federal 
attention.411 Realizing that the EPA would never have the money 
or the personnel to address the cleanup of the thousands of 
abandoned hazardous waste sites across the nation, Congress 
drafted the Superfund Amendments Reauthorization Act 
(SARA)48 of 1986 with the underlying goal of ensuring rapid 
cleanups by private parties.47 
Although Congress believed that encouraging negotiated 
cleanups would accelerate the rate of cleanup and reduce its ex-
pense by tapping into the private sector, Congress and the EPA 
reinforced the notion that its settlement policy was not intended 
to replace or diminish its strong and aggressive enforcement pol-
icy.48 Thus, with the competing goals of facilitating cleanups 
while assuring a strong set of legal enforcement standards, Con-
gress employed four general settlement incentives in SARA: 1) 
cashing out de minimis contributors and landowners, 2) granting 
releases from liability to settling parties, 3) encouraging the 
EPA to enter into partial settlements, and 4) offering contribu-
. tion protection.49 
SARA set out the procedure to address de minimis parties 
which the EPA's original settlement policy left out. First, SARA 
defined two categories of de minimis parties: de minimis con-
tributors and de minimis landowners.60 De minimis contributors 
are those parties who contributed a comparatively low amount 
of hazardous substances relative to volume or toxicity.61 Realiz-
ing that this definition did not adequately apply to non-contrib-
43. [d. 
44. [d. at 2837. 
45. Legislative History P.L. 96·510, supra note 17, at 6120. 
46. SARA, infra note 50, at 1615. 
47. Legislative History P.L. 99·499, supra note 42, at 2882. 
48. [d. at 2883. 
49. Balcke, supra note 33, at 135. 
50. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. 
No. 99·499, § 122(g), 100 Stat. 1613 [hereinafter SARA). 
51. [d. § 122(g)(1) at 1685. 
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uting landowners who acquire liability under Superfund,1I2 the 
Judiciary Committee amended an earlier draft of SARA to in-
clude such "innocent" landowners in de minimis settlements.1I3 
Hence, SARA defined de minimis landowners as owners of con-
taminated property who did not contribute any hazardous sub-
stance to the site nor have actual or constructive knowledge of 
the contamination at the time of purchase.1I4 SARA authorized 
the EPA to enter into expedited final settlements with these two 
categories of de minimis parties "whenever practicable and in 
the public interest."1I11 If the PRP qualified as de minimis, the 
party would pay a premium to the EPA to mitigate the risks 
involved in early settlements. liB The EPA in return for the pay-
ment would issue a covenant not to suell? to ensure the end of 
the de minimis party's potential liability. "Both types of de 
minimis settlements are intended to relieve the covered parties 
from prolonged and costly litigation"1i8 while allowing the EPA 
to receive cash to clean up sites - consequently simplifying set-
tlements with the remaining major PRPs. The EPA hoped that 
the establishment of the de minimis provision would increase 
the "numbers of voluntary settlement agreements ... [b]ecause 
de minimis contributors may be attracted by the advantages of-
fered by section 122(g) settlements, and non-de minimis parties 
may be encouraged to settle as a result of the revenues raised 
52. CERCLA, supra note 3, § 107 at 2781. Superfund imposes liability on landown-
ers, regardless of fault. If the landowners can prove that they acquired the contaminated 
property without knowledge or reason to know of its contamination, they are eligible for 
the innocent owner defense under 107(b)(3). The de minimis provision creates a mecha-
nism for this category of landowners to cash out of the settlement, avoiding unnecessary 
transaction costs. If the EPA does not grant the party de minimis status, the landowner 
can litigate liability in a court of law. 
53. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3279. 
54. SARA, supra note 50, § 122(g)(1)(B) at 1685. See also H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 31 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 
3054 [hereinafter Judiciary Comm. Rep.). 
55. SARA, supra note 50, § 122(g)(1) at 1685. "Expedited Final Settle-
ments.-Whenever practicable and in the public interest, as determined by the Presi-
dent, the President shall as promptly as possible reach a final settlement with a poten-
tially responsible party in an administrative or civil action under section 106 or 107 if 
such settlement involves only a minor portion of the response costs at the facility con-
cerned .... " 
56. These risks include cost overruns during the completion of the remedial action 
and the risk that further response action will be necessary in addition to what is known. 
57. SARA, supra note 50, § 122(g)(2) at 1685. 
58. Judiciary Comm. Rep., supra note 54. 
9
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through such agreements. "119 
B. OBSTACLES TO De Minimis SETTLEMENTS 
Several months after SARA was signed into law,80 the EPA 
issued interim guidelines on settlements with de minimis waste 
contributors (guidance for de minimis landowners was not writ-
ten until nearly two years later).81 "This document provides 
guidelines for determining which potentially resp'onsible parties 
('PRPs') under section 107(a) of ... CERCLA ... as amended 
by . . . SARA . . . may qualify for treatment as de minimis 
waste contributors pursuant to section 122(g)(1)(A) of SARA." 
It also provides guidelines for negotiating and settling with such 
contributors.82 Yet, the guidance on de minimis contributors 
conflicts with SARA's underlying goal of encouraging expedited 
settlements. Critics suggest that this is because the EPA fears 
"criticism for settling too cheaply at the cost of delaying settle-
ment and increasing transaction costs to itself and the PRPs."83 
Others suggest that EPA officials favor a strong enforcement 
policy over any settlement devices.8" Whatever the specific rea-
son, the guidelines reveal that EPA's hesitance to enter into de 
minimis settlements is attributable in part to the following 
deficiencies. 
First, because of vague language and inadequate defiriitions, 
PRPs are at the mercy of the EPA to decide their de minimis 
status. The guidelines dictate "that the de minimis contributor 
59. Superfund Program: De Minimis Contributor Settlements, 52 Fed. Reg. 24333, 
24334 (1987) [hereinafter 52 Fed. Reg. 24333). This is because the more money received 
in cash outs from the de minimis contributors, the less money the major contributors 
will be held liable for from the EPA. 
60. President Reagan signed Public Law 99-499 on October 27, 1986. President's 
Statement Upon Signing H.R. 2005, 22 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1412 (Oct. 27, 1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 3441. 
61. 52 Fed. Reg. 24333, supra note 59. For the EPA's guidelines for de minimis 
landowner settlements, see Superfund Program: De Minimis Landowner Settlements, 
Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34235 (1989). 
62. 52 Fed. Reg. 24333, supra note 59, at 24333-24334. 
63. Bernstein, Summarizing Certain Provisions and Issues Under the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 349 PRAC. L. INsT. 13 (1988). 
Bernstein suggests that early settlements involve risk to the government. Id. at 12. See 
also Bernstein, supra note 38. 
64. See Bernstein, supra note 38. 
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will be defined on a site-specific basis. "66 To qualify as a de 
minimis contributor, the party's contribution to the site must be 
comparatively low in volume or toxicity.66 If the EPA deter-
mines that the PRP's contribution meets the volume and toxic-
ity requirements, the settlement must be determined to be 
"practicable and in the public interest. "67 As Congress did not 
provide definitions for "whenever practicable and in the public 
interest"68 or "minor portion of the response costs"69 or "mini-
mal in comparison to other hazardous substances,"7o the inter-
pretation is left to the EPA. 71 Thus a de minimis contributor 
will have to incur further transaction costs while waiting for the 
EPA to determine the party's eligibility for this settlement tool. 
Second, although the guidelines specifically articulate that 
the de minimis settlement goal is "to resolve [the party's] liabil-
ity quickly and without the need for extensive negotiations with 
the Government,"72 the implications of the guidelines dictate 
otherwise. Specifically they state, ". . . as a general rule, de 
minimis settlements should not be concluded prior to comple-
tion of a PRP search (including title search and financial assess-
65. 52 Fed. Reg. 24333, supra note 59, at 24335. Section IV states, "the approach 
taken by this guidance ... is that the de minimis contributor will be defined on a site-
specific basis. To qualify as a de minimis generator or transporter, the PRP must have 
contributed an amount of hazardous substances which is minimal in comparison to the 
total amount at the facility. The PRP must also have contributed hazardous substances 
which are not significantly more toxic and not of significant greater hazardous effect than 
other hazardous substances at the facility, as well as meeting the other conditions set 
forth in this guidance." [d. at 24335-24336. 
66. For example, "at the Cannons Engineering disposal site in Bridgewater, Massa-
chusetts, de minimis settlement documents which have been accepted by over two hun-
dred fifty parties have been criticized by major contributors as allowing too large a share 
of the total contribution to be settled for too small an amount too early in the process. 
EPA set 1 percent or less as the de minimis contribution amount, which ineligible par-
ties claimed was too high a threshold. . . . By contrast, at the Maxey Flats nuclear dis-
posal site in Morehead, Kentucky, EPA has been criticized by small volume contributors 
for resisting an expedited de minimis settlement where over four hundred of the five 
hundred named parties each is listed as having contributed one-tenth of 1 percent of the 
waste or less." J. Ruhl, Solid and Hazardous Waste, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 35, 36 
(1988). 
67. 52 Fed. Reg. 24333, supra note 59, at 24336. See also, supra note 55. 
68. SARA, supra note 50, § 122(g)(1) at 1685. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. § 122(g)(I)(A) at 1685. 
71. Mays, EPA Enforcement Policies Under SARA: An Analysis of Guidelines, on 
Releases, De Minimis Settlements, NBARS, and Mixed Funding, 349 PRAC. L. INST. 18 
(1990). 
72. 52 Fed. Reg. 24333, supra note 59, at 24336. 
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ments) or prior to such time as the Agency is confident that ade-
quate information about the extent of each settling party's waste 
contribution to the site has been discovered. "73 A PRP search 
and remedial investigation/feasibility study (RIIFS) could take 
years to complete, consequently preventing the de minimis 
party from saving transaction costs and cashing out early in the 
settlement process.7• Although the cash premiums that de 
minimis parties pay when settling exist to mitigate the EPA's 
risk when negotiating early settlements, the EPA still insists on 
extensive data, inhibiting any expedited settlement process.75 
Third, even after years of extensive information gathering 
during which transaction costs accumulate, and even after the 
de minimis party pays a cash premium to the EPA, the de 
minimis contributor is still not guaranteed a full release from 
liability. Almost admitting its fear of de minimis settlements, 
the guidelines mandate that "in order to protect the Agency. . . 
settlements should in most cases, also include a reservation of 
rights which would allow the Government to seek further relief 
from any settling party if information not known to the Govern-
ment at the time of settlement is discovered.. "76 
Fourth, although the guidelines suggest that the EP A 
should encourage small parties to organize and present settle-
ment offers to the Agency,77 the EPA has essentially been insti-
73.Id. 
74. Bernstein, supra note 38, at 7. The author states that even after years of study 
and litigation, the EPA is usually reluctant to conclude that it is confident about the 
total costs of cleanup. One field study alone took the EPA sixteen months to complete. 
Such a field study included collection of soil samples from all over the site, monitoring of 
wells, sampling and analysis of water and sediments, and an aerial mapping. Norwood 
PCB Site, Norwood, Massachusetts, EPA Region 1 Press Release, (Nov. 1988). 
75. See Progress of the Superfund Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 181, at 186-193, (1980) (statement of Richard L. Hembra, Assoc. Dir. 
Resources, Community, and Econ. Dev., G.A.O.)[hereinafter Hearing #100-203). In a 
study on two de minimis settlements requested by the Subcommittee on Oversite and 
Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, a major impediment in the 
settlement process is the EPA's belief that it did not have sufficient information to relia-
bly estimate clean up costs to pursue the settlements, even though the potentially re-
sponsible parties and their contributions to the pollution at the sites were generally 
known for several years. 
76. E.g., 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 59, at 24337. 
77. "De Minimis parties should be encouraged to organize and present multi-party 
settlement offers to the government." Id. at 24334. 
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tuting a reactive role, waiting for de minimis parties to come to 
them with a settlement proposal. 78 Yet conflicts among PRPs 
and cost allocation disputes are the more common causes of im-
passe in the settlement process, which in turn slow ongoing ne-
gotiations with the EPA.79 Unfortunately, the EPA's guidance is 
silent on when and how regional offices should encourage poten-
tial de minimis parties to settle and when and to what extent 
regional offices should conduct negotiations to bring about a 
settlement.80 
By 1988, the EPA had completed only one de minimis set-
tlement in 15 months.81 Consequently, members of the House 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation ordered the EPA 
to compile a report on the status of all sites on the National 
Priority List (NPL) contemplated to involve de minimis par-
ties.82 Further, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tion of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce re-
quested testimony on the de minimis guidelines of 1987 during a 
hearing to assess the EPA's progress in implementing SARA.83 
The testimony suggested "that de minimis settlements have re-
ceived a relatively low priority in EPA's Superfund enforcement 
program. "84 
78. Hearing #100-203, supra note 75, at 182. 
79. Cohen, Allocation of Superfund Cleanup Costs Among Potentially Responsible 
Parties: The Role of Binding Arbitration, 18 ENVTL. L. INsT. 10158 (1988). For example, 
in a study on de minimis settlements a settlement was significantly delayed due to the 
EPA's reactive role. Despite a request from legal counsel from one group of de minimis 
parties that the EPA enter into the negotiations, the EPA held back, hoping the de 
minimis parites and the steering comittee for the major parties could come to an agree-
ment. Yet, due to conflicting interests among the parties, this did not happen. Hearing 
#100-203, supra note 75, at i91. 
80. See Hearing #100-203, supra note 75, at 192. Recently, "the EPA suggested to 
its regional offices that they 'consider pursuing a more proactive approach towards de 
minimis settlements.' " Id. at 182. 
81. Letter from John D. Dingell, Dennis E. Eckart, Norman F. Lent, and Dan 
Slickman, to Administrator of the EPA, Lee Thomas (Feb. 9, 1988), reprinted in Pro-
gress of the Superfund Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Inves-
tigation of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1988). 
82. Id. at 20. 
83. Hearing #100-205, supra note 75, at 181. 
84. Id. at 190. The EPA in Region V admitted that "settlements for overall site 
cleanup have a higher priority than the attainment of de minimis settlements, although 
these [regional] officials are aware of the benefits such settlements can provide to the 
overall settlement process. An official stated that prior to SARA, limited funding slowed 
Superfund work, creating a backlog of site studies and cleanup decisions. Since SARA, 
with its mandated cleanup time frames, region V's focus has been on completing the 
13
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Thus, although the EPA's goal is to resolve de minimis par-
ties' liability quickly and without the need for extensive negotia-
tions with the government, few de minimis parties will be able 
to settle, and those that do will likely face lengthy and tedious 
negotiations.811 
III. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Several months after the EPA published its interim guide-
lines on de minimis contributor settlements, EPA published an-
other guidance document on another settlement tool: alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR).86 
Alternative dispute resolution encompasses techniques and 
procedures that utilize third-party neutrals to assist adversaries 
in reaching an agreement.87 The primary processes are negotia-
tion, mediation, arbitration, and minitrials.88 
Arbitration is a private dispute resolution procedure (con-
trasted with public adjudication provided by courts and admin-
istrative agencies) which the involved parties design to serve 
their particular needs.89 In general, arbitration agreements pro-
vide for joint selection and payment of the arbitrator, objective 
standards on which the arbitrator's decision will be based, and 
procedural rules to be applied by the arbitrator.9o Courts usually 
respect the resulting decision of the arbitrator as final and bind-
ing, consequently discouraging future appeals td the courts and 
making the final decision of the arbitrator meaningful,91 
studies and remedy selections and obtaining overall site cleanup agreements with re-
sponsible parties. As a result, the de minimis process has received little regional staff 
time and effort .... " [d. at 190-191. 
85. Whitlock, De Minimis Settlement Prouisions of the 1986 Superfund Amend-
ments, 16 COLO. LAW. 643 (1987). 
86. Guidance on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques in Enforce-
ment Actions, published in 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 35123 (1987) [hereinafter ADR Guidance]. 
(De Minimis guidelines were published in June, 1987, ADR guidelines in August, 1987). 
87. Rennie, Kindling the Enuironmental ADR Flame: Use of Mediation and Arbi-
tration in Federal Planning, Permitting, and Enforcement, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10479 
(1989). 
88. For an overview of alternative dispute resolution, see S. GOLDBERG & E. GREEN & 
F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985)[hereinafter Goldberg, Green & Sander]. 
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A mediator, in contrast, has no power to impose a final deci-
sion. Rather, the parties reach their own agreement with the as-
sistance of the mediator.92 The involvement of the parties in for-
mulating the final agreement usually results in greater 
satisfaction and a higher level of compliance than with judicial 
decrees.93 
The mini-trial is a dispute resolution hybrid process that 
combines elements of negotiation, mediation, and adjudication.9" 
The parties sign a procedural agreement that can be similar to 
rules of civil procedure, informally exchange key documents, and 
select a mutually acceptable neutral advisor to preside over the 
mini-trial.9 !! Unlike the arbitrator or judge, the neutral advisor 
has no authority to make a binding decision, but the presider 
may ask questions that probe the strengths and weaknesses of 
each party's case.9S 
Alternative dispute resolution in environmental disputes 
(environmental ADR) first came to fruition in 1973 in a case 
that employed mediation to resolve a long-standing dispute over 
a proposed flood control dam.97 Environmental disputes offer 
several differences from the traditional disputes98 which may 
have slowed the initial acceptance of using alternatives in this 
area. For example, environmental cases can involve issues having 
irreversible effects on the environment, the disputes can typi-
cally involve multiple parties (some claiming to represent the in-
terests of the wildlife or inanimate objects), and implementation 
of the environmental agreement may pose further problems.99 
Yet, the timeliness and cost of litigation gave way to creative 
dispute resolution techniques in the environmental arena. 100 In 
the decade following the success of the Snoqualmie River media-
tion, mediators and facilitators were employed in over 160 envi-
92. [d. at 91. 
93. [d. at 92. 
94. [d. at 271. 
95. [d. at 272. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. at 406, excerpt from G. Bingham, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A 
DECADE OF EXPERIENCE. The author chronicles the Snoqualmie River Dam in Washing-
ton state. 
98. [d. at 404. 
99. [d. 
100. Dubasek & Silverman, Environmental Mediation, 26 AM. Bus. L. J. 539. See 
also Goldberg, Green, & Sander, supra note 88, at 406. 
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ron mental disputes in the United States. IOI 
Although the private sector began to employ alternative dis-
pute resolution techniques, the government was skeptical on us-
ing ADR in enforcement cases.102 The government seemed to 
fear appearing weak on enforcement because they were allocat-
ing some of their control to a third party. lOS Consequently, the 
use of ADR in environmental enforcement actions was 
limited. 104 
Finally, in 1987, the Environmental Protection Agency's Ad-
ministrator, Lee Thomas, stated that he viewed ADR as a new, 
cheaper, and potentially more effective enforcement tool than 
traditional methods. 1011 He issued guidance to the EPA regional 
offices on ADR techniques in environmental enforcement actions 
describing the characteristics of enforcement cases suitable for 
ADR, procedures for approval of cases for ADR, procedures for 
selection of third-party neutrals and procedures for management 
of ADR cases.10e The guidance only pertains to non-binding 
forms of dispute resolution and notes that any EPA use of ADR 
techniques would not mean more lenient results for violators or 
a weaker EPA enforcement position.l07 This cautious approach 
has kept government far behind private sector use of ADR.108 
101. Goldberg, Green, & Sanders, supra note 88, at 406 
102. See generally, Mays, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Environmental En-
forcement: A Noble Experiment or a Lost Cause? 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10098 (1988). The 
author explains that the federal government has resisted attempts to apply ADR to envi-
ronmental enforcement cases and notes that only with support from both the govern-
ment and the private sector will ADR succeed. 
103. Id. See also ADR Guidance, supra note 86, at 35124. 
104. Rennie, supra note 87. 
105. Id. 
106. ADR Guidance, supra note 86. 
107. Id. at 35124. Specifically the guidance states, "EPA does not mean to indicate 
that by endorsing the use of ADR in its enforcement action, it is breaking away from a 
strong enforcement position. On the contrary, the Agency views ADR as merely another 
tool in its arsenal for achieving environmental compliance ... Since ADR addresses only 
the process (and not the substance) of case resolution, its use will not necessarily lead to 
more lenient results for violators; rather, ADR should take EPA to its desired ends by 
more efficient means." 
108. Pou Institutionalizing ADR in Federal Agencies 3 Alternatives Newsl. (ABA) 
I, at 3 (1989). Senator Grassley (R-Iowa), who introduced an ADR bill in Congress stated 
that "most federal agencies lag behind private and other public entities that must re-
solve disputes." Arbitration Provisions of ADR Bill Are Controversial at Senate Hear-
ing, 3 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REP. 331 (1989). 
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In an effort to spark agency use of ADR techniques, Senator 
Grassley (R-Iowa) introduced the Administrative Dispute Reso-
lution Actl09 which authorizes and encourages use of ADR for 
resolution of agency disputes. llo Specifically, the bill mandated 
that each federal agency adopt a policy that addresses the use of 
alternative dispute resolution, and that each agency designate 
senior officials responsible for administering the policy.lll The 
bill provides for training on a regular basis on ADR techniques 
such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, and calls for 
confidentiality of ADR proceedings unless the parties agree oth-
erwise. ll2 More controversial is the bill's authorization of bind-
ing as well as non-binding uses of dispute resolution 
techniques.1l3 
In the Senate Hearings on the bill, most of the concern 
arose from the Department of Justice (DOJ) who claimed that 
the bill's binding arbitration provisions were unconstitutional.lI4 
The DOJ stated· that the arbitrator could be considered an of-
ficer of the United States, but would not be appointed under 
Article II, §2, clause 2 of the Constitution with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, or be subject to executive supervision. lUi 
Second, the DOJ argued that binding arbitration does not follow 
precedent, which DOJ stated was important to the coherent ap-
plication of law and principles. lI6 Despite DOJ concerns, the 
American Bar Association testified at the hearing that the arbi-
trator was not an officer of the United States because the use of 
arbitration is voluntary and the parties involved define the scope 
of the proceedings. 117 
With the authorization of binding arbitration still contained 
in the bill, Congress passed the bill at the end of the 101st Con-
gress with the hope that it will enhance the operation of the 
109. S. 971, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter S.971). 
110. [d. See also, New Laws and Bills, 3 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REP. 202 
(1989). 
111. 3 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REP. 202. 
112. [d. 
113. [d. 
114. Arbitration Provisions of ADR Bill Are Controversial at Senate Hearing, 3 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REP. 331 (1989). 
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Government and better serve the public. ll8 
B. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SUPERFUND 
Recently, ADR experts and environmentalists have been re-
alizing the suitability of dispute resolution techniques for 
Superfund cases.l19 In addition to a number of pilot projects120 
on the subject, the American Arbitration Association recently 
sponsored a seminar program on ADR techniques in Superfund 
cases.121 Some reasons for this suitability between ADR and 
Superfund include Superfund's harsh strict joint and severallia-
bility standards (increasing the probability that if a PRP liti-
gated, that party may be stuck with 100 percent of the clean up 
costs), the complexity of Superfund cases (causing excessive 
court time in explaining to juries the technicalities of the issues 
at stake), and the elimination of many of the larger legal issues 
(they are usually clarified by environmental studies on the site), 
leaving only smaller legal questions to be litigated.122 
In fact, the Superfund amendments of 1986 (SARA)12S in-
clude arbitration provisions for cost recovery settlements not ex-
ceeding $500,000 dollars.12' Yet, as tl:te EPA's goal is to en-
118. H.R. 2497, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 148 CONGo REC. S18225 (1990), Pub. L. No. 
101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990). 
119. A few major works on this topic include: Gilbert, Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion and Superfund: A Research Guide, 16 ECOLOGY L. Q. 803 (1989), Anderson, Negoti-
ation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 2 DUKE L. J. 261 (1985), 
Cassel, Negotiating Better Superfund Settlements, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. S1l7 (1989). 
120. Susskind, The Special Master as Environmental Mediator, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10239 (1987). 
121. The seminar, given in several places across the country, was entitled Superfund 
Simplified: Arbitration, Mediation and other ADR Techniques in Environmental Dis-
putes. At the Seminar in San Francisco co-sponsored by the Environmental and Water 
Law Section of the Bar Association of San Francisco, two EPA officials sat on the panel, 
three environmental attorneys, a representative from California's Office of Environmen-
tal Affairs, and a representative from Bechtel Environmental Inc. See also U.S. Not Mo-
tivated in CERCLA Disputes to Use Alternative Dispute Resolution, ENv'T. REP. (BNA) 
(Jun. 27, 1990). 
122. Rennie, Kindling the Environmental ADR Flame: Us of Mediation and Arbi-
tration in Federal Planning, Permitting, and Enforcement, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,479 
(1989). 
123. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 [hereinafter SARA). 
124. SARA, supra note 125, § 122(h)(2) at 1686. This section states, "Arbitration in 
accordance with regulations promulgated under this subsection may be used as a method 
of settling claims of the United States where the total response costs for the facility 
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courage private party cleanup without use of the "fund",l2& if 
the EPA finds viable PRPs, it would rather enforce the liability 
provisions of CERCLA 126 to mandate that the PRPs pay for 100 
percent of the cleanup, than invoke the fund and sue for cost 
recovery.1lI7 Cost recovery cases could arise with unwilling 
PRPS,128 or in emergency response actions.1lI9 The infrequency of 
cost recovery suits and the relatively small amount involved 
make arbitration less risky for the federal government and thus 
a likely candidate for the use of ADR. Yet, despite the EPA 
guidelines on arbitration procedures for small cost recovery 
claims,130 no cost recovery cases have been arbitrated to date.131 
As the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of 
Justice have final discretionary authority over the suitability of 
a claim for arbitration, as long as government fears ADR, arbi-
tration cases under SARA will be nominal. 132 
concerned do not exceed $500,000 (excluding interest). After consultation with the Attor-
ney General, the department or agency head may establish and publish regulations for 
the use of arbitration or settlement under this subsection." 
125. See supra note 29. 
126. Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 
1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, at 2781 (codified at 42 V.S.C.A. §§ 
9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990» [hereinafter CERCLA). 
127. Krickenberger & Rekar, Superfund Negotiators Suggest ADR As Way to 
Break Settlement Logjam, 3 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REP. 242 (1989). 
128. [d. The authors describe cost recovery scenarios, explaining that at one ex-
treme, there is no known PRP and no potential for cost recovery. At the other extreme 
- the enforcement led extreme - all PRPs at a site are known and viable, and all costs 
are paid by these PRPs. At both extremes there is no cost recovery. In between the 
extremes is the case of the agency having identified viable but unwilling PRPs, or having 
settled with some PRPs but only for a portion of the costs. 
129. Telephone Interview with David C. Batson, Esq, Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Liaison, Superfund Division of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance, Environ-
mental Protection Agency (Feb. 4, 1991). (EPA will engage in an emergency removal 
action when site is extremely hazardous and dangerous). (For example, at a PCB-con-
taminated Norwood site in Massachusetts, EPA initially cleaned up hot spots of PCB 
contamination in 1983, and is presently still engaged in settlement negotiations for the 
remaining costs of remedial action. Telephone Interview with Cameron Kerry, Attorney, 
Mintz Levin, Boston, Massachusetts (July 11, 1990». 
130. Arbitration Procedures for Small Superfund Cost Recovery Claims, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 23164. 
131. Telephone conversation with David Batson, see supra note 131. 
132. [d. Also, telephone conversation with Kirk Oliver, Esq., Senior Attorney and 
Administrator for the Hazardous Substance Arbitration Panel, California State Office of 
Environmental Affairs, (Feb. I, 1991). Both governmental figures suggest this because 
little monetary incentive exists for government agencies to implement ADR. Department 
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In addition to EPA's demonstrated fear of appearing weak 
on enforcement,133 other obstacles to EPA's implementation of 
ADR include the regional offices' lack of knowledge and under-
standing of ADR,134 the high costs at stake in settlements (be-
tween $5 and $50 million),l3II the lack of incentives for the 
agency to engage in ADR,136 the lack of time and resources to 
negotiate,137 and the EPA's perception that use of ADR means 
engaging in mixed-funding settlements which will deplete the 
"super" fund. 1s6 
C. A CASE EXAMPLE: CALIFORNIA'S ATTEMPT AT MERGING ARBI-
TRATION AND SUPERFUND 
One of the key ingredients to a successful settlement is cost 
allocation among the major potentially responsible parties.139 If 
the settlement is to produce a voluntary cleanup by the PRPs, 
then a consensus must be reached on the appropriate remedy, 
total costs, and distribution of liability.140 Although CERCLA 
provides no mechanism to resolve cost allocation disputes, Cali-
fornia's state superfund law allows for the use of binding arbi-
tration to apportion liability for the cost of removal and reme-
dial actions. HI 
California's law creates an arbitration panel chosen from a 
list of independent private arbitrators who have applied to the 
133. ADR Guidance, supra note 86, at 35124. 
134. Cassel, Negotiating Better Superfund Settlements: Prospects and Protocols, 
16 Pepperdine L. Rev. S117, S160: Also Telephone Interview with David Batson, supra 
note 131. Batson noted that the ignorance on alternative dispute resolution techniques 
exacerbates the EPA's fear that submitting to ADR will mean loss of control. He men-
tioned time and ADR successes as the solution to this problem. 
135. Cassel, supra note 136 at 164. 
136. [d. at 165. 
137. [d. See also EPA's region V case studies, supra note 84. 
138. Krickenberger, supra note 129, at 246. Mixed funding settlements are those 
where both EPA and private party funds are used to clean up the site. As this depletes 
"the fund," this is not a goal of EPA enforcement officials. SARA, supra note 125, § 
122(b) at 1679. See also, Habicht, supra note 29, at 47. 
139. Cohen, Allocation of Superfund Cleanup Costs Among Potentially Responsi-
ble Parties: The Role of Binding Arbitration, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10158 (1988), also Gar-
rett, Superfund: Apportionment of Liability, 1 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 25 (1985). 
140. Cohen, supra note 141. 
141. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25356.1-3 (West 1991). Remedial Action Plans 
are plans for permanent remedies or removals prepared pursuant to CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 25356.1 (West 1991). 
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State's Office of Environmental Affairs for membership. Three 
arbitrators are chosen for each dispute, one selected by an 
agency of the state, another by a majority of the PRPs who have 
submitted to binding arbitration, and the third arbitrator, by 
the two previously-selected arbitrators.142 
However, certain conditions must exist before a party can 
submit to an arbitration proceeding. A remedial action plan 
(RAP) must be completed by the Department of Health Ser-
vices, wherein all potentially responsible parties are identified; 
only those PRPs listed in the RAP with an aggregate alleged 
liability in excess of 50 percent of the costs of removal and reme-
dial action can elect to submit to binding arbitration; and those 
parties must file a request for an arbitration plan within 15 days 
after the remedial plan was issued.143 Further, the RAP must 
contain a preliminary non-binding allocation of responsibility 
(N-BAR) which the state agency can write in such a way as to 
invoke or not invoke arbitration. 1 •• The N-BAR thus gives the 
state complete discretionary power over the submission of cost 
allocation to arbitration. l46 If the case is an appropriate one for 
arbitration and the above factors are met, then the panel will 
apportion liability based on pre-determined factors. I.e 
142. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25356.2 (West 1991). This arbitration procedure 
is quite different than the one recommended by the EPA for small cost recovery claims. 
For cost recovery, EPA's guidelines provide for one arbitrator chosen from a national 
panel of environmental arbitrators established by the association offering arbitration ser-
vices to the EPA. From this panel the association sends a list of 10 of its arbitrators to 
the parties involved. Each party then has 10 days from the receipt of this list to object to 
any of the arbitrators and select the remaining persons in the order of preference. From 
among the persons the parties have deemed acceptable, the association then picks one. 
See Arbitration Procedures for Small Superfund Cost Recovery Claims, supra note 132 
at 23182. 
143. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25356.3 (West 1991). 
144. Telephone conversation with Kirk Oliver, Esq, Senior Attorney and Adminis-
trator for the Hazardous Substance Arbitration Panel, California state Office of Environ-
mental Affairs (Feb. 1, 1991). 
145. [d. 
146. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25356.3(c)(I-5) (West 1991). The California stat-
ute requires the panel to apportion liability based on all of the following criteria: 
(1) The amount of hazardous substance for which each party may be responsible. 
(2) The degree of toxicity of the hazardous substance. 
(3) The degree of involvement of the potentially responsible parties in the genera-
tion, transportation, treatment, or disposal of the hazardous substance. 
(4) The degree of care exercised by the potentially responsible parties with respect 
to the hazardous substances. 
(5) The degree of cooperation by the potentially responsible parties with federal, 
21
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Each PRP whose liability is determined by the panel is then 
held accountable for the apportioned share of the costs of re-
moval and remedial action at the site. Upon full payment of the 
apportioned share or full cleanup of the site, the PRP is released 
from any additional civil liability to any governmental entity 
and may seek indemnity from any other persons liable for the 
party's apportioned share, including government agencies. I "7 
However, recalcitrant PRPs subsequently found liable have no 
right to indemnification from any party who participated in the 
arbitration proceedings. us 
The first arbitration was completed by the panel in 1986, 
and to date, the panel has only been invoked on two other occa-
sions. I "9 Although only 3 cases have been arbitrated, the longest 
of those occupied only 5.5 days of hearing time. lllo 
Members of the arbitration panel suggest that the stringent 
criteria mandated by the statute inhibit any arbitration activ-
ity.11I1 One big impediment is the RAP requirement. Not only is 
the RAP cumbersome and expensive, but it can take years to 
complete.11I2 In addition, limiting the jurisdiction of the panel to 
only PRPs with an aggregate liability of over 50 percent ex-
cludes de minimis parties from the convenience and inexpen-
siveness of arbitration, unless they find other PRPs to fulfill the 
50 percent requirement. 
The EPA and California's state environmental agency have 
both incorporated arbitration proceedings in their Superfund 
bills, but have limited its application so severely as to make its 
state, and local officials to prevent harm to human health and the environment. 
147. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25356.6 (West 1991).- Additional civil liability; 
modification of arbitration decisions; indemnification for removal or remedial actions. 
148. Id. 
149. The three hazardous waste sites in which cost allocation were arbitrated are the 
following: In the matter of Hoopa Veneer/Humboldt FIR, (State of California Office of 
Secretary of Environmental Affairs, Hazardous Substance Clean-up Arbitration Panel, 
#86-011), In the Matter of Placerita Canyon Facility, (State of California Office of Secre-
tary of Environmental Affairs, Hazardous Substance Clean-up Arbitration Panel, #87-
0001), and In the Matter of El Capitan Site, (State of California Office of Secretary of 
Environmental Affairs, Hazardous Substance Clean-up Arbitration Panel# 89-0102). 
150. U.S. Not Motivated in CERCLA Disputes to Use Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion, Env't. Rep. (BNA) (June 27, 1990) Also, telephone conversation with Kirk Oliver, 
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impact on accelerating Superfund settlements nominal. Where 
EP A limited its scope by the monetary size of the suit, Califor-
nia limited its scope by limiting the persons who could use arbi-
tration. Where EPA attempted to decrease its risk at stake by 
arbitrating only small claims, California decreases its risk by re-
quiring a cumbersome Remedial Action Plan to be prepared. 
Both leave final discretionary authority to arbitrate with the 
governmental agency, and both policies seem to stem from gov-
ernment fear of losing control in the settlement process.153 
California's Hazardous Substances Cleanup Arbitration 
Panel is the only one of its kind in the United States, as it arbi-
trates one of the most critical issues in the settlement process: 
cost allocation. l54 Widening the panel's jurisdiction to all PRPs 
including de minimis parties would perhaps increase the use of 
arbitration, which in turn would increase arbitration's popular-
ity as PRPs and the government would realize the cost-effective-
ness of this dispute resolution technique. 155 
IV. ADR AND DE MINIMIS CONTRIBUTORS 
Arbitration and the de minimis settlement mechanism are 
both congressionally established methods of expediting settle-
ments of hazardous waste site disputes. Yet both statutory pro-
visions amount to giving settlement incentives to the govern-
ment agency rather than the intended potentially responsible 
party. For instance, in Superfund's de minimis provision and 
California's arbitration statute, extensive studies must be com-
pleted before any settlement negotiation can be entertained. All 
settlement tools discussed (de minimis, arbitration for cost re-
covery, and arbitration for cost allocation in California) grant 
153. Also, Thomas Grumbley, then president of Clean Sites (an agency created to 
help use ADR techniques in Superfund) testified "In all of these cases [ADR and mixed 
funding] the Agency is collectively saying that it does not want to lose control of the 
process. This is of course, an unnecessary worry, since the law clearly makes the Agency 
the final arbitrator of any decision. Inside the Agency, however, there is a feeling that 
the willingness to negotiate, to settle if you will, means loss of control." See Progress of 
the Superfund Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations 
for the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, looth Cong., 2nd Sess. 58 (1988)(State-
ment of Thomas P. Grumbley, President of Clean Sites, Incorporated). 
154. Telephone conversation with Kirk Oliver, supra note 146. 
155. This can be done by eliminating the NBAR requirement from the Remedial 
Action Plan (RAP). Without the NBAR, any potentially responsible party can submit to 
arbitration. See telephone conversation with Kirk Oliver, supra note 146. 
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the government agency final discretionary authority to invoke 
the settlement tool. 1116 And, just as EPA initially refused to enter 
into settlement negotiations representing less than 80 percent of 
a site's cleanup costs, California's Office of Environmental Af-
fairs (OEA) refuses to invoke arbitration with PRPs represent-
ing less than 50 percent of the site's clean up costs. Further, 
each government in drafting the settlement tool incorporated 
risk minimization techniques. In de minimis settlements, the 
federal government can reserve the right to re-open the settle-
ment, negating the EPA's covenant-not-to-sue the de minimis 
contributor given in exchange for that party's cash-out. In arbi-
tration for cost recoveries, the federal government only allows 
this form of ADR for cost recoveries less than $500,000 dollars. 
Consequently, in the four years since its adoption, no cost recov-
ery claims have been arbitrated. 11l7 Thus, more is needed than 
just congressional approval or authorization of these settlement 
tools. 
A congressional mandate to utilize ADR to facilitate the 
identification of PRPs and to allocate cleanup costs could help 
EP A meet the original intent for de minimis settlements - to 
accelerate cleanups by expediting settlement negotiations. Spe-
cifically, binding arbitration to determine cost allocation among 
identifiable PRPs would enable EPA and the PRPs to readily 
ascertain those parties who are de minimis, consequently saving 
money in transaction costs by early settlements, while receiving 
money from the cash outs to begin response action. 
ADR commentators have suggested other methods of ADR 
to allocate PRP responsibility. Common suggestions are forms of 
non-binding ADR such as mediation or neutral fact-finders. IllS 
Yet,as these forms are non-binding, EPA is not bound by the 
156. The de minimis provision leaves EPA as the final interpreter of its vague lan-
guage, supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text. California's superfund bill also man-
dates that the government agency has the final say. See supra notes 145-148 and accom-
panying text. 
157. Telephone conversation with Janice Linnett, U.S. Environmental Office of En-
forcement and Compliance Monitoring (Feb. 4, 1991). 
158. See generally, Cassel, supra note 121. Cassel suggests that EPA use mediators 
to arrange for de minimis settlements because they provide for "varied solutions." See 
also, Susskind, The Special Master as Environmental Mediator, 17 ENvTL. L. REP. 10239 
(1987). (Mediation suggested for cost allocation because it creates a high degree of volun-
tary compliance). 
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result in any subsequent negotiation or litigation and the deci-
sion is not admissible in any lawsuit. The effect is similar to the 
SARA-established NBARlll9 (non-binding preliminary allocation 
of responsibility) which was also added to SARA to expedite set-
tlements. Commentators suggest that NBARs rarely succeed be-
cause the result is not binding on the government or the PRPs, 
making their utility as a settlement tool limited.16o 
However, binding arbitration has proven successful when in-
voked in cost allocation disputes.16l The pure fact that it is 
binding ensures the probability that settlements will be resolved 
quickly and efficiently. The result will be lower transaction costs 
for all parties involved, and the goal of de minimis contributor 
settlements will be achieved. 
Mediation may be better to determine a party's eligibility as 
a de minimis contributor. As this must be decided on a case-by-
case basis, no legislation can create a formula to hasten this pro-
cess. Yet third-party neutrals may be ideally situated to work 
with the small contributor and the government agency to estab-
lish the party's qualifications as a de minimis contributor. Of 
course, if arbitrators allocated liability early, de minimis status 
could be based on the binding. results of the arbitrator's 
decision. 
V. CONCLUSION 
EP A has created as many devices to avoid settlements as 
Congress has to create them. Although both branches of the gov-
ernment seem to acknowledge the advantages of alternative dis-
pute resolution in negotiating settlements, EPA's nominal use of 
such techniques should send a caveat to Congress when and if it 
chooses to amend Superfund a second time. In sum, where the 
EP A is faced with the competing goals of a strict enforcement 
159. SARA, supra note 125, § 122(e)(3) at 1682.-"The President shall develop guide-
lines for preparing nonbinding preliminary allocations of responsibility. In developing 
these guidelines the President may include such factors as the President considers rele-
vant such as: volume, toxicity, mobility, strength of evidence, ability to pay ... When it 
would expedite settlements under this section and remedial action, the President may, 
after completion of the remedial investigation and feasibility study, provide a non-bind-
ing preliminary allocation of responsibility which allocates percentages of the total cost 
of response among potentially responsible parties at the facility." 
160. Cohen, supra note 141. See also Balcke, supra note 9. 
161. See infra note 164. 
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policy and facilitating settlements, the strict enforcement policy 
has won. 
California has ventured into the unknown waters of ADR 
and discovered its incredible advantages.162 Its statute is the 
first of its kind in the country,168 and as such could serve as a 
model for Congress to improve upon, having the benefit of retro-
spect. Growing support of ADR exists in the private sector, Con-
gress, and the EPA. To make it work in Superfund cases, EPA 
must be willing to share its enforcement authority with ADR. 
Jennifer Martin* 
162. In a letter to California's Secretary of Environmental Affairs regarding the first 
arbitration by the Hazardous Substance Cleanup Arbitration Panel, California's Depart-
ment of Health Services' Chief Deputy Director wrote, "We believe this case was a suc-
cess because of the judicious and efficient manner in which the arbitration was con-
ducted and the positive impact arbitration had on the cleanup of this hazardous waste 
site ... this cleanup occurred in an expeditious manner because the responsible party 
was confident that the arbitration process would provide a fair and binding allocation of 
responsibility." Letter from Alex Cunningham, Chief Deputy Director, Department of 
Health Services, to Ms. Jananne Sharpless, Secretary of Environmental Affairs (Dec. 18, 
1987). . 
163. Telephone conversation with Kirk Oliver, see supra note 146. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992. 
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